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We compare some of the policies that have been attempted in Europe (UK/Scotland) and Israel 
over the past fifteen years  to elaborate a new Systems Evolutionary (SE) framework for 
rethinking  VC policy and related  ITP. We argue that this perspective is useful for both real 
world (‘positive’) analysis and policy (‘normative’) analysis.  
Our SE framework is shaped by (i) a multidimensional view of VC; (ii) strong between VC, 
VC policy and the development of EHTCs; and (iii) a strategic approach to policy.  In contrast, 
many VC policies in Europe up to and including the 1990s took a ‘static’ financial view of VC 
that focused on ‘bridging existng early phase finance gaps of innovative companies’ rather than 
creating of a new mechanism to assure the timely growth of EHTCs. 
We aim to present the new framework rather than to provide specific recommendations. The 
main conclusion is that the success of VC policies depend on factors such as the phase of 
evolution of (i) VC or related innovation finance organizations; (ii) the underlying segment of 
start up companies and of high tech industries; (iii) the specific country/region institutional 
setting. While in some contexts it may be worth considering the targeting of a new VC 
industry/market (and associated EHTC) in others the focus of policy should center in improving 
pre-emergence conditions. More specifically it may be, given that VC searches for ‘investment 
ready opportunities’, that ITP should, in many contexts, precede VC policies. 
Another key conclusion is that implementing this perspective necessitates the creation of a 
strategic level of policy, with a view of specifying a set of strategic priorities for Science, 
Technology, and Innovation, priorities that should precede rather than follow policy design and 
implementation. A major challenge is to extend the present framework that was initially based 
on VCs oriented towards ICT to LS. 
ACRONYMS 
VC - Venture Capital according to Gompers and Lerner (1999; 2001) definition; VC* - VC 
oriented exclusively to early stage finance of high tech Start Up;  VCs - VC firms; PEs - 
Private Equity firms; CVC - corporate VC; BAs -Business Angels; MBOs - Management Buy 
Outs; IVA-Israel Venture Capital Association; EVCA-European Venture Capital Association; 
BVCA-British Venture Capital Association;  STE  -  Science, T echnology and Education; 
SCEn-Scotland Enterprise; EHTCs - Entrepreneurial High Tech Clusters; ILC - Industry Life 
Cycle;  ITP-Innovation &  Technology Policy;  ICT  -  Information and Communication 
Technologies; LS - Life Sciences; SUs - High Tech Start-ups. 
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1. Background  
1.1 General 
The objective of this paper is to contribute to a European  “VC Policy Framework”. 
Despite many attempts to develop high impact VC policies in Europe, a consensus 
seems to exist that the policies that were implemented up to and including the 1990s 
where only partially successful and their impact was below expectations. No country 
in Europe has undergone a full VC* emergence process. Our presumption is that such 
failure is related to the perceived nature of VC mainly as ‘pools of money” rather than 
industry/market whose emergence could potentially be targeted by policy. This might 
explain the apparent overemphasis on m onetary incentives (with little regard for 
generating VC capabilities) and the strong supply push bias. 
On the contrary, both the US and Israel have succeeded in creating VC 
industries/markets as outcomes of cumulative emergence processes. In Israel, this was 
the result of an explicit VC-directed policy, the Yozma program. In both countries, VC 
supported high tech SUs and was originally oriented to co-evolve with high tech 
industries. Israel’s policy-led VC emergence benefited from the US experience with 
VC and from prior US-Israel links. However, these were only preconditions for a 
successful policy. At least four other factors explain the Israeli policy success: (i) the 
objective of Yozma was creation of a domestic VC industry and market; (ii) its novel 
(at the time) design, the funds-of-funds approach, up-side incentive for professional 
private investors, attraction of capable foreign agents, and collective learning; iii) the 
timing of implementation; and iv) the background conditions created since 1969 that 
led to a strong demand for VC by capable SUs. 
This paper question the conclusions reached by past research on VC policies that did 
not consider emergence of a VC/VC* industry/market as an important policy objective 
(Avnimelech and Teubal 2008a). In particular, Gilson (2003) argues that replicating 
the emergence of a US VC sector in other countries entails three simultaneous factors: 
a high number of SUs looking for VC funding, investors seeking high-risk and 
technology-based opportunities and, the existence of specialized VCs that operate as a 
nexus of contracts. Given two of these conditions, Gilson (2003) predicts that the third 
will automatically be satisfied. 
This ‘one size fits all’ perspective has been  criticized. First, the dynamics of 
emergence of VC industries/markets differ from case to case. Second, institutional 
change has been an important factor in the emergence of a VC sector in the US, UK 
and Israel. For example, in Israel, the liberalization of the financial markets, easier 
access to foreign public markets, the immigration of skilled workers, the definition of 
the limited partnership (LP) structure and favorable tax regimes attracted many 
investors to the VC industry.  
Third, some authors stress the role of demand-side factors. The interwoven growth of 
high-tech SUs and VC/VC* funds may be prevented by the likely concentration of VC 
investment on opportunities characterized by lower transaction costs and/or shorter 
periods of realization (Martin et al 2005). This propensity would drive VCs away from 
early-stage ventures and induce them to invest in geographically close opportunities. 
Recent studies suggest that that VC policy should focus on the demand side, which 
means, enhancing technological capabilities and the emergence of “investor-ready” 
opportunities (Mason and Harrison [MH] 2003). Becoming “investor ready” hinges on   3   
the availability of capabilities necessary to structure and grow successful businesses 
and on the articulation of these capabilities in terms of stocks of high tech SUs and 
associated deal flows. While VCs and other investors can be the source expertise that 
translates into benefit to portfolio companies, these will only begin operating once 
sufficient ‘investor-ready’ opportunities are in place. This implies that understanding 
the dynamic relationship between VC and high-tech entrepreneurship often requires 
focusing on context-specific factors, mainly those that trigger  cumulative  co-
evolutionary processes. 
It follows that from a policy angle, a major issue is timing the triggering of the co-
evolutionary process. On the one hand, it would be difficult to create a VC industry in 
advance of capabilities necessary to structure and grow successful businesses since LP 
VCs (with a limited time horizon for exiting) will be attracted by actual rather than 
potential opportunities. On the other hand, it is also difficult to create the capabilities 
necessary to structure and grow successful businesses in the absence of VC. 
Overcoming this problem of creating supply (demand) in the absence of demand 
(supply) represents a major policy challenge.  
 
1.2 Approaches to the analysis of VC and VC policy 
There are two approaches to the analysis of VC and VC policy: a  hybrid ‘finance 
perspective’ focusing on VC as pools of money and on the operation of existing VC 
organizations and VC industries/markets; and a SE perspective focusing also on the 
emergence of new VC industries/markets. The first perspective focuses on incentives 
to fundraising and investment while the new SE perspective focuses on a broader set of 
instruments and policies including those associated with the development of 
capabilities and the creation or emergence of multi-agent structures (a new industry, 
market, cluster, and product class). The finance perspective originated in the ‘finance 
literature’ (Gompers & Lerner 1999).
i Its policy implications are relatively static and 
general; and they have not been very successful. The SE perspective to VC/VC* policy 
has its origins in early VC and VC-related research focusing on Silicon Valley and the 
history of the US VC industry (Florida & Kenney 1988; Saxenian 1994, Zook 2002-4). 
It also draws from the geographical cluster development literature in general 
(Bresnahan et al., 2001; Feldman & Francis 2001; Fornhal & Menzel, 2006). Recently 
it received support from research on the emergence of the VC industry/market in Israel 
(Avnimelech and Teubal 2004; 2006, 2008a, b) and the UK (Rosiello and Parris 2008).  
The SE approach is expressed  in terms of (i) phases in the emergence of the new 
industry/market (an ILC perspective) and (ii) policy phases that sustained and 
triggered such a process. At present Israel’s successful VC targeted program (Yozma) 
is being studied, emulated and adopted (with adaptations) by a wide variety of 
countries, both in Europe and elsewhere  - Russia in 2004 (OECD 2006), New 
Zealand’s NZVIF in 2002 (Lerner et al., 2005), Latvia in 2005 (Paxis Manual 2006), 
and Slovakia in 2007.   
The  SE perspective to innovation and VC policy also suggests that, provided 
appropriate background and pre-emergence conditions prevail or are created by policy, 
VC could be a central vector in the creation of (or transformation of) existing clusters 
towards more startup-intensive EHTCs (Avnimelech and Teubal 2006, 2008a,b). This 
would require the assistance of sophisticated policymaking, so that VC could become a   4   
major mechanism by which a country/region could benefit from ICT, LS and other 
emerging EHTCs. 
A VC-led emergence profile of an EHTC, while seemingly having been so in the case 
of Silicon Valley and Israel (mostly in relation to ICT), is not the only possible profile 
of emergence. The organization of finance may differ from region to region and so the 
dominant forms of VC organization  may differ from the LP form. As a result, the 
dynamics and profiles of emergence may also vary from case to case. Variety relates 
primarily to the types of financial institution involved, that is, VCs, BAs, PEs, CVC, 
internal corporate venturing, technological incubators, government R&D grants, banks 
offering credits to new firms, and public sources of VC such as co-investment schemes 
or funds-of-funds. Moreover, variety concerns investee companies and the agents who 
provide funds to VCs, which often results in different portfolio characteristics across 
countries with respect to stage, geographical scope, and sectors (Mayer et al. 2003). 
Finally, variety is influenced by higher education system culture, by business culture 
and by the industrial structure of the region/country.  
 
1.3 Specific Research Objectives 
The ultimate objective of this work is to contribute to a “VC Policy Framework”. The 
analysis will consist of two main parts: a) a short summary of the SE perspective to 
ITP (Section 2); and b) elements of the proposed framework for VC policies for 
Europe (Sections 4-5). The former represents an underpinning of the latter; and they 
will be used to criticize past VC policies in Europe, particularly those implemented 
during the 1990s (Section 3). The  SE perspective is an extension of existing 
evolutionary, institutional and systems of innovation approaches with a particular 
focus on integrated policies in innovation-related areas. It assumes that a dynamic and 
turbulent global context with radical uncertainty; the overarching objective of policy is 
to trigger and sustain cumulative process of knowledge and innovation-driven 
economic growth. 
 
2. A SE Perspective to ITP & VC Policy: General Principles 
The need for a new perspective follows from the weak impacts of past policies and the 
enhanced needs of VC in order to latch into the ICT and LS revolutions, and other new 
emerging technological markets. Policy-makers are required to deal with uncertainties 
concerning both the fitness for context of their proposed interventions and their 
economic impact. Assuming radical uncertainty, the overarching goal of innovation 
and VC policy is to trigger and sustain high impact cumulative and self-reinforcing 
processes of innovation-led growth. A first requirement for the effective application of 
the proposed policy perspective is that policymakers consider what cognitive structures 
to access and what constraints  and opportunities  to consider when designing and 
implementing policies.  
With respect to VC policies, we should consider the nature of VC and the elements of 
the system that affect VC policies and their impact. The answers to this question will 
provide pointers to the set of VC-related policies required and it will directly affect the 
design, timing and implementation of the VC policies themselves.   5   
The notion of evolutionary targeting is also central. The general framework does not 
focus specifically on VC nor on any one country or industrializing economy; even less 
does it argue that the possibility and desirability of targeting a particular industry such 
as VC is open to all economies at all times. Rather it proposes that under certain 
circumstances, it is possible and it could be desirable to target multi-agent structures 
such as new sub-branches, product classes, technology sectors, markets or clusters.
ii  
 
2.1 VC Intermediation Issues  
The identification and selection of new forms of intermediation lies at the heart of the 
creation of new markets/industries. This also holds in relation to VC. Gompers & 
Lerner argued that VC (a new ‘supply agent’) mediates between ‘investors’ and 
innovative companies in ways that the traditional banking system (old ‘supply agent’) 
did not, thereby overcoming ‘market failure’ originating in asymmetric information 
and other factors. They also observe that the financial services provided by VC 
organizations to SUs are ‘equity investments’ rather than loans. These have been 
bundled with other added value services to SUs in the areas of R&D strategy, 
international expansion, facilitating IPOs, and marketing (Antonelli and Teubal 2008). 
VCs have undergone significant transformations with LPs eventually becoming the 
dominant form of VC organizations in Israel, the UK and the US. In addition, the SUs 
themselves (demand agents) have also undergone significant transformation to be more 
suitable for VC finance by becoming more open to equity finance and temporal control 
transfer and by adopting rapid growth models. 
A new intermediation form is a pre-emergence condition for the creation of new 
market/industry, one that further specifies and complements the well-known 
emergence of dominant design condition of ILC theory (Abernathy & Utterback [AU] 
1978). Beyond product/service bundling issues due to economies of scale in market 
building and in transactions costs, it involves the mutual adaptation of the supply 
agent, the demand agent and the institutional structure (Antonelli and Teubal 2008) as 
mentioned in the context of VC. Concerning the importance of institutional changes 
for the emergence of a VC industry and market in the US, Gompers and Lerner (1999, 
2001)  emphasize the importance of a flexible regulatory environment concerning 
investments by pension funds.   
While an appropriate intermediation form leading to industry and/or market emergence 
should be viewed as resulting from a dynamic process, there is no assurance that this 
will occur. Moreover, there can be a variety of VC pre-emergence configurations with 
the potential to lead to successful emergence and, unlike the Israeli case, precursor 
organizations that dominate pre-emergence need not be of the same type as those that 
eventually come to dominate the new industry/market. Thus, the emergence of less 
formal organizational precursors, such as BAs consortia, may  constitute a pre-
emergence condition leading to more formal and larger actors.
iii  This was probably the 
case in the US, where LPs became the dominant organizational form only after VC 
emergence (Avnimelech, Kenney and Teubal 2006). What is important, however, is 
that the particular configuration/bundling of products/services and of organizational 
forms provide significant value to users/clients.  
Under these conditions, an accelerated process of emergence may take place while an 
organizational and product/design configuration is evolving. For example,  Don  and   6   
Harrison (2006) show that in the  Scottish case hybrid investors including family, 
friends, and  BAs are important sources of VC*, in a situation where the  UK trend 
suggests that LPs are increasingly orienting their portfolio towards later stages. In 
Israel between 2001 and 2008 (maturity phase) VC became less early stage oriented; 
while the BA community grew rapidly and took VC’s place as the dominant type of 
agent involved in early stage finance (Avnimelech & Schwartz, 2008). In the US a 
similar phenomena occurred during the mid-late  1990s (Sohl 2003). These trends 
suggest it may be difficult to predict whether certain ‘pre-emergence’ dynamics will or 
will not lead to specific VC organizational configurations during emergence and 
maturity. 
Whether or not a selected pre-emergence VC organizational form will come to 
dominate the ‘emergent’ VC industry, an effective pre-emergence dynamic must 
involve processes of experimentation and learning, explicit pre-emergence policies and 
a favorable external environment. Achieving a new, high value, intermediation form 
links with the evolutionary targeting framework (Avnimelech & Teubal 2008a) of 
analysis, in that it is a central pre-emergence condition for the full emergence of new 
industries/markets. 
 
2.2 Towards a Typology of Policies and the ITP Portfolio 
ITP and VC policy  include incentive programs, institutional/regulatory changes, 
systematic policy evaluations and the identification of strategic priorities. Incentive 
programs can be classified in terms of their objectives (promoting business sector 
R&D; the creation of innovative capabilities in firms; the type of entities receiving the 
incentives (firms, university-company consortia, general infrastructures); and the 
instrument used (subsidies, tax incentives, loans). We consider two types of direct 
support to companies, horizontal and targeted programs. Horizontal programs support 
functions like R&D rather than specific sectors or technologies, are open to all firms, 
and leave to firms the freedom to choose projects (Teubal 1997). Targeted programs 
support firms belonging to a particular sector or undertaking projects in particular 
technological areas. Recent work has emphasized the point that in many circumstances 
early direct support to companies should emphasize horizontal programs while, as time 
and experience accumulate, a partial shift towards targeted programs may be desirable 
(Teubal 1997; 2008a,b). Implementing incentives programs may require attention not 
only to monetary incentives but also to capabilities, organization, and strategy. 
Comparing the experiences of VC policy implementation in Israel and UK/Scotland 
inspires the following considerations. First, incentives’ programs alone might not be 
effective enough without complementary regulatory/institutional changes. Second, the 
successful evolutionary targeting of higher levels of organization in the present global 
environment involves a  radically different process from targeted policies aimed at 
‘picking winners’ (Avnimelech & Teubal 2008a). Third, targeted policies should be 
implemented during ‘windows of opportunity’ in coincidence with a supportive 
external environment (such as technological revolutions or rapid economic growth), 
while the implementation of horizontal programs is less time sensitive. 
Even when the objective is the emergence of a new VC industry/market, it is important 
to consider other VC-related policies. Such as support of innovation at the firm level, 
the support of specific science/technology fields at universities or research institutes,   7   
direct support of SUs, and adapting anti-trust legislation. These may be implemented 
before or during the actual targeting of VC. More generally, an SE perspective could 
stimulate policy makers to analyze the effects of sets of interrelated policies, some 
implemented at a point in time, others distributed through time.  
It is also important to consider negative side effects related to high tech sectors with a 
dominant VC-industry, such as extremely narrow technological and geographical focus 




2.3 Strategic Level Policy 
A strategic policy level requires a distinct set of capabilities and institutions. The 
strategic level’s central function is to set strategic priorities, to identify system failures 
blocking their attainment by the existing system and associated policies, and, together 
with the operational level, to identify and design new policies whenever these are 
called for by the new priorities.  Such an articulation of the new policy priorities will 
be reflected in new or restructured programs and institutional changes and 
discontinuation of some or all existing programs.  
Beyond the identification and articulation of new strategic priorities, a strategic level 
of policy should be involved in policy coordination and in characterizing the central 
dimensions of the country’s actual and future policy portfolio for purposes of 
comparison, analysis and implementation through time.  
 
2.4 Heterogeneity of VC policies  
Heterogeneity of VC policies  arises from variation in  sector/technology and 
country/country types, the structure and capabilities of the business sector;  the 
presence of islands of scientific excellence in the country (and what these areas are); 
and institutional  structures  and policy  capabilities.  Objectives could  also  vary 
depending on expected changes in the external and internal environments facing the 
country/region, and on strategic policy priorities. 
Considering  inter-sectoral differences, a comparison between ICT a nd LS is 
interesting. From very early stages, VC-backed ITC ventures can grow faster. If they 
are successful, they can rapidly generate the surplus of capital that can be re-invested 
in the locality as well as facilitate the training of serial entrepreneurs who are essential 
to grow high-tech clusters. LS are different in that the development process takes a lot 
longer, requires much higher capital commitments and entails more technological and 
regulatory uncertainty (Rosiello and Parris 2008; Tait 2007).  
Numerous variants of ICT/LS clusters could represent a country’s strategic priority. In 
Israel, in relation to LS,  clusters include i ) continuation of a  generics-based LS 
sector/cluster based on the spectacular success of the leading generics company 
(Teva); ii) a cluster where R&D on ethical drugs becomes dominant; and iii) a  LS 
cluster focusing on generics, orphan drugs, diagnostics and applications of 
biotechnology to agriculture and other areas.  Our policy perspective suggests that 
when it comes to set strategic ICT or LS cluster priorities, the relevant variants should 
be identified and assessed from the point of view of overarching national objectives.   8   
3. Venture Capital Policies  
3.1 VC Policies in Europe (OECD reports) 
OECD (2000; 2003)  reports  reveal that governments invest risk finance in small, 
innovative firms in order to bridge ‘funding gaps’. Three directions of VC policy up to 
and including the 1990s are frequently mentioned: government direct supply of capital 
to firms; providing financial incentives to VC investments; and broadening investment 
rules. The 2000 OECD report lists ‘supply side measures’ in support of VC, which 
include promotion of private VC investment; removal of barriers to entrepreneurship; 
development of second tier capital markets; direct equity investments in SUs; and 
equity guarantee programs. While warning about the risks of crowding-out private VC, 
this report concludes that governments can play a useful role if such schemes are 
properly conceived. 
The UK Government leads in the implementation of OECD recommendations, some of 
which aim at stimulating investment in innovative technology (table 1). However, UK 
private equity investment remains biased towards late stage opportunities. Over half of 
total UK investment (59% in 2006) funded MBOs, a trend that affects LS and ICT.  
Post 2000 OECD recommendations focus on a number of central points: 
•  Quantitative restrictions on institutional investors should be eased to 
broaden the sources of VC in many OECD countries  
•  Lower capital gains tax rates will stimulate entrepreneurs and investors, 
while avoiding the need for special VC tax incentives 
•  Government equity programmes can stimulate private venture financing 
but should be phased out when private markets mature 
•  Governments should link angel networks to public programmes, such as 
technology incubators
v 
According to  OECD (2003) in many  countries, regulation prevents institutional 
investors, such as pension funds and insurance companies, from investing in private 
equity. In the UK, investment constraints on insurance companies were released in 
1994 and a minimum funding requirement introduced by the 1995 UK Pensions Act.  
Concerning incentives to VC, the risk profile of seed and SU firms is not generally 
compatible with the investment criteria of large financial institutions and, increasingly, 
merchant VCs. Thus, existing PEs may not help in developing early phase-oriented VC 
and they can be direct or indirect obstacles to such a development. It follows that 
governments may have to play a relatively active role in order to assure development 
of such a segment. A good example is the Yozma program in Israel that not only 
channeled substantial amounts of risk capital to young firms, but also helped, 
indirectly, to train managers who later launched their  own funds stimulating the 
emergence of a VC sector
vi. Channeling VC into SUs has also been one of the targets 





   9   






Introduced in 1994, EIS provides income tax relief for new equity investment by 
external investors and BAs in qualifying unquoted companies and capital gains tax 
exemption on disposal of shares. It does not apply to investors who own more than 
30% of the shares. Investors can obtain income tax relief at 20% on investments up to 
£200,000 in any tax year.  Reliefs are available only for investment in new ordinary 
shares. Investors must hold their shares for at least 3 years. 
NESTA 
Ventures 
Direct Investment in early-stage companies. Portfolio covers a range of sectors: 
Engineering, Environmental Technology, Healthcare, and Information and 
Communications Technology. It invests a maximum of £500,000 in each company in 





ECFs invest a combination of private and public money in SUs seeking up to £2 
million of equity finance. The funds help to address the scarcity of equity capital in the 
£500,000 to £2 million funding rounds. Total investment: £100M.The approval of these 
ECFs is subject to contract and funds will have up to six months to raise the full 
amount of private capital. Each ECF makes equity investments of up to £2 million into 






RVCFs are an England-wide programme to provide risk capital finance to small and 
medium size enterprises (SMEs) who demonstrate growth potential. The funds, 
managed by VC professionals, are commercially focused. Short-term objectives: to 
increase the amount of equity gap venture capital available to the SME market and 
which does not displace any existing fund activity in this segment of the market. Long-
term objectives: (i) to ensure  that each region in England has access to VC; (ii) to 
demonstrate to potential investors that commercial returns can be made; and (iii) to 
increase the supply of managers in the equity gap. 
 
OECD (2003) recognizes that “not all public initiatives are well-targeted, and some 
have outlived their original purpose and usefulness”. Over time, public programmes 
tend to converge towards the same market segments as the existing private sector, 
strengthening of PEs rather than creation of early phase oriented VC. A related point is 
that even if public initiatives lead to publicly owned/managed VCs, these could crowd 
out private investors and even delay the development of early-stage financing.  
Again the Israeli case of Yozma is one where rather than crowding out private 
investments and privately owned/managed VC funds, the government VC component, 
by generating conditions for complementary public/private investment, set the stage 
for subsequent private VC investments (Avnimelech and Teubal 2006, 2008a,b). More 
generally, either by promoting a cumulative process of growth and emergence with 
dynamic economies of scale or through strict definitions of areas of investments and 
matching funds, Government funds may ameliorate the problem of crowding out 
private investors. 
 
3.2 A Critique of VC Policies in Europe (with a focus on UK/Scotland) 
Our short review of VC policies recommendations for OECD countries reflects the 
tendency to base VC policies on VC as a ‘pool of money’ rather than an ‘industry’ 
view; on static rather than SE analysis; and on a non-precise definition of what VC is 
and is not. This approach explains the prevalence of monetary incentives in the 
policies and its objectives can be phrased in terms of closing an early phase funding 
gap for high tech SUs rather than in creating new support structures for a growing 
number of SUs as part of the promotion of entrepreneurial clusters. Further, most   10   
policies were designed as one shot policy rather than a dynamic phased policy. This 
contrast with the Israeli case, which could be interpreted as implicitly based on VC as 
new industry/market priority associated with the transition to an EHTC as part of on an 
ongoing phased policy toward the goal of innovation based economic growth. 
A second point is the OECD emphasis on private crowding-out effects, which would 
result from a Government VC component. There is little if any reference to the 
possible complementarity between the Government and the private components of VC 
(Avnimelech and Teubal 2006, 2008a). Strong complementarities may depend both on 
context (whether or not a favorable pre-emergence condition exists) and on the specific 
channels through which the Government contribution is funneled to the economy.  
Ever since the 90s, developing a strong VC based on the US model has represented a 
strategic priority.  For instance, t he UK accounts for some 40% of the European 
market, over  €10 billion in 2004. Out of this, however, only 15% goes into VC 
financing for seed-growth-expansion phases while much of the rest is invested in 
replacement capital and buyouts (EVCA, 2005). VC investment in the UK is also 
extremely concentrated in some regions, with about 75% of BVCA members located 
in Greater London and making 92% of their investment in the Southeast region 
(Martin et al 2005).  
The UK Government has devised a series of policies to support the development of the 
VC sector and to channel investment in less-favored regions. Some of these initiatives, 
such as the RVCFs, have been criticized because of their limited impact in stimulating 
the emergence of regional VC markets (OECD 2003), their excessive emphasis on 
covering supply-gaps (MH 2002; Harding 2002) and the inadequate consideration 
given to the “dynamic learning process in which demand and supply processes 
combine with their embededness in social networks and individual perceptions in a 
mutual reinforcing way” (Martin et al 2005, p.1)
vii.  
The mandate to invest only in commercially viable ventures combined with limitations 
on investment size and geographical scope cause problems for those funds located in 
areas that lack opportunities. On the one hand, lack of funds tends not to be the sole 
cause of investor-unreadiness. On the other hand, strong commercial trends may not 
allow for enough experimentation, which can inhibit the emergence of entrepreneurial 
capabilities.  
In contrast to the several countries/regions of Europe, Israel’s Yozma program 
involved a Government VC component, most of it ‘delivered’ to hybrid, privately 
owned LPs (a fund-of-funds function), rather than through a Government owned VC 
company. This may contribute to explain why it managed to leverage substantial 
additional funding. The VC organizations created in the wake of Yozma (or 
participating in the program) and which invested a total of 250 M$ in the  Yozma 
program (100 M$ Government money and 150 M$ additional private money) raised an 
additional 4.200 M$ until the year 2000. This is an extreme case of non-crowding out.  
Both the emphasis on a fund-of-funds approach and the existence of favorable pre-
emergence conditions explain why in Israel a strong complementarity was found 
between the Government’s VC contribution and private contributions. Hence, it could 
be misleading to emphasize too much the ‘crowding out phenomenon’; in the real 
world, there are contexts and mechanisms, which can transform what seems to be a 
‘structural’ crowding-out into strong complementarity. Public/private VC funding   11   
complementarities may exist but they depend on context and whether their existence 
may trigger a self-sustained, private VC-intensive process of VC*/EHTC emergence. 
 
3.3 Comments on Research on VC policies 
Gilson’s Proposal 
According to Gilson (2003), the central lesson from the successful US experience in 
generating a VC market is “the extremely effective contracting structure that covers 
the entire venture capital cycle, from initial investment in the VC fund, to the VC 
fund’s investment in a portfolio company, to the exit from the portfolio investment to 
allow the VC fund’s cash and non-cash investment to be recycled” (p. 1092). Gilson 
asks whether this model could be replicated elsewhere and whether the Government 
could engineer the process. Gilson assumes that the foundational structure of capital 
markets already exists. 
The creation of a VC market is a difficult coordination problem, in that the supply of 
entrepreneurs is responsive to venture funding and to the appropriate financial 
institutions. He assumes that the first successes with VC would endogenously attract or 
´reveal´ new entrepreneurs. Based on our examination of VC policies, we argue that 
such a statement may be misleading. There are cases where a few early entrepreneurs 
become engines of growth by re-investing their wealth and using their skills and 
expertise to support other companies. If this process is strong, enough it could generate 
a cumulative process of growth of entrepreneurship. However, in other contexts it need 
not be the case and the required entrepreneurship may not emerge, certainly not 
necessarily within the time framework required to create a VC industry.  
 
Critique of Bottazzi et al (2004) 
In recent years, research interest has risen on policies to promote VC.  The  basic 
conclusion is that an active VC market will strongly respond to ‘incentives’ but will 
not respond to attempts by Governments to directly affect the flow of funds directed to 
venture investments. This conclusion squares with past failures of Government owned 
VC funds to promote active capital markets, and to the accepted view reported in 
OECD documents that such funding would ‘crowed-out’ the flow of privately owned 
funds to VC markets.  
However, the results of Bottazzi et al. (2004) are not consistent with evidence that 
even in countries with a well-developed VC sector (such as the UK ) SUs suffer from a 
lack of funding (EVCA 2005), VC investment is often concentrated in some regions 
(Martin et al 2005; Sunley et al 2005), and synergies may exist between public policy 
and the rate of private VC investment - as in the cases of Israel (Avnimelech and 
Teubal 2006) and Scotland (Don and Harrison 2006). On the contrary, the SE theory 
stresses that policy action must fit within the existing industrial and institutional 
context, select the right timing, and coincide with the materialization of capabilities 
and infrastructure for innovation that are critical for the emergence of high-tech 
clusters.  
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4. Constructing a VC Policy Framework 
From a  SE perspective the actual VC policies applied in Europe suffered from a 
number of weaknesses or insufficiencies, which future policies should avoid. These are 
classified into five main issues.  
 
4.1 Avoiding an Excessive Emphasis on Closing Early Phase Finance Gaps 
An emphasis on supply factors or supply push approaches has a long tradition in 
policymaking both ITP in general and VC policy in particular. Over the past few years 
policy analyses and evaluations have increasingly emphasized the importance of taking 
into account demand factors when considering policies (OECD 2003) although few 
have recognized the link between ‘learning to innovate’ (including ‘collective’ and 
‘interactive’ aspects) and the creation of demand for innovation. In the VC policy area 
an expression of this emphasis on supply are VC policies designed to close the ‘early 
phase finance gap’ facing high tech SUs. This view takes the ‘demand’ for such 
finance (a result of the pool of SUs) as given. This is a restrictive view of national 
priorities in this entrepreneurial phase of rapid change in ICT/LS. Thus, if one of the 
objectives is to induce knowledge-based growth by latching into the ICT/LS through 
cumulative processes, then, rather than filling the needs of existing SUs, an important 
component of the required strategy should be the promotion of both technological 
entrepreneurship and SUs development.  
 
4.2 Focus on Dynamics 
While not strictly necessary, it could be useful to express the dynamics of evolution of 
VC and of high tech clusters in terms of an extended and modified ILC perspective. In 
AU (1978) there are three phases-a fluid phase, a growth phase and a rigid/mature 
phase; and the theory is relevant only for those industries that traverse the full set of 
phases. Two of the extensions and modifications introduced by Avnimelech and 
Teubal  (2006)  in their a nalysis of Israel’s VC industry are relevant: the focus on 
conditions for creation of a new industry and/or market; and market/industry creation 
as ‘an emergence process’ that is a process characterized by dynamic increasing 
returns to scale. Emergence is a particular process of ‘qualitative’ change whereby a 
set of precursor agents originally acting independently (the AU’s early, fluid phase) 
become, through a process of interaction, a multi-agent  higher level organizational 
structure, such as a new industry or market  or cluster (the AU’s growth phase). The 
term emergence refers both to the new organization and to its properties, neither of 
which characterizes the individual agents. Thus, a dominant design, a new 
intermediation form, the new formal and informal institutions, and the relative stability 
of the higher-level structure are emergent properties.   
Turning now to the ‘normative’ side, a static view of policy is often accompanied by 
an  incomplete view of the pre-conditions for policy success. The weak impact of 
policies derived from either a lack of required preconditions for a successful VC/VC* 
and EHTC (the policy objective and/or its underpinning in terms of strategic priorities 
was not a ‘reasonable’ or ‘feasible’ one) or the fact the policy implemented was not 
appropriate from the point of view of its objective. In the latter case, failure may be the 
result of inadequate design and timing of policies rather than  inappropriate policy 
objectives.   13   
The preconditions for a successful VC policy depend on country, domestic context 
(economic structure and institutional structure), the existing state of VC or relevant 
informal substitutes, and other factors pertaining to the global environment. Despite 
the limited policy experience, it seems that the prior existence of a growing mass of 
“investor-ready” SU is a necessary condition. In many cases the state of preconditions 
is such that rather than directly promoting VC the objective of VC policy should focus 
on improving preconditions, thus paving the way for a successful VC policy in the 
future.  
In a more dynamic framework and assuming that the ultimate objective of VC policy is 
the emergence of a domestic VC market and/or industry, the set of possible 
combinations of elements comprising pre-conditions for policy success is wide, in that 
there may be considerable  variation in the ‘weaknesses’ of existing system which 
block socially desirable VC/VC* growth. Weaknesses may stem from macro-
economic problems or regulatory hurdles or lack of entrepreneurship. Each (or each 
combination) of these can be associated with a different market/system failure profile. 
Frequently, an early recognition of such pre-conditions would shift the focus of VC 
policy from VC-directed policies (with a dominant focus on monetary incentives) to 
VC-related policies, such as support of innovation, entrepreneurship, and institutional 
changes with the aim of improving pre-emergence conditions.  
It follows that heterogeneity of the ‘pre-emergence conditions’ which VC policies may 
be required to act upon is yet another source of VC policy heterogeneity. For instance, 
while Edinburgh is home to global banks and several investment funds, only a few 
institutional VCs are located in Scotland and a high proportion of  technology 
investments come from BAs (over 600M pounds of investment in private equity in 
2000-4), a significant proportion of which is co-funded by SCEn. This very distinctive 
set of pre-emergence conditions could become a very favorable precursor to develop a 
vibrant VC industry domestically, one that co-evolves with the emergence of a vibrant 
local economy or cluster.  
The above example also suggests that an initial phase of Government support to LS or 
ICT firms could focus on increasing investments with a view to create a critical mass 
to trigger self-sustaining cumulative processes of growth by ‘pulling’ VCs and 
VC/VC* investments. This support  would not only contribute to reinforce pre-
emergence conditions but may also generate  additional information about the 
desirability of promoting emergence of a VC industry/market in the future. 
Furthermore, initiatives like co-investment programmes and grants can also contribute 
to develop entrepreneurial and managerial skills.  
 
4.3 A Multi-dimensional View of VC & Classification of VC policies 
Our analysis suggests three ‘pure’ views of what VC consists of from the perspective 
of a policymaker (rather than the two ‘hybrid’ views of Section 1.2). The first (early) 
view comes from the Finance literature, VC being a ‘pool of money. The second view 
starts with a distinction between the funds on the one h and and the organizations 
managing the funds on the other, with policy having to address both. This is the view 
enshrined in the Gompers and Lerner (1999) and in Gilson (2003). According to the 
third view not only is VC a pool of money and organizations that manage it (and their   14   
contracts and routines); it could also become an industry/market (Avnimelech & 
Teubal 2006).
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This latter multidimensional view of VC underlies a novel generation of VC policies. 
Under certain circumstances, the object of policy should be VC organizations to be 
promoted; however, in other circumstances, when a dominant intermediation form has 
been achieved, the object of policy could be to trigger and sustain a VC emergence 
process where VC is considered a new industry/market (not a mere intermediary). A 
further objective of VC policy can be to increase the variety of agent in an existing VC 
industry, which is the current post- emergence stage of the Israeli VC policy. These 
policy options do not exclude the possibility that a SE perspective to VC* policy may 
entail focusing on the ‘pool of money’ dimension, for instance when strengthening the 
access to foreign sources of funds in the aftermath of a global economic crisis.  
It should be noted that the successful early promotion of VC organizations might not 
lead to a subsequent policy for promoting a VC industry. In certain cases, the existing 
set and variety of VC agents, even if not constituting an industry, may be sufficient to 
satisfy national priorities particularly in the short run and especially for a small 
country/region in Europe. This could be even more so when that region/country can 
connect to the global VC industry and when domestic demand may become, without 
additional policies, part of the global market.  
A basic distinction between VC-directed policies and VC-related policies, with the 
former directed to VC and the latter to other functions or components of the innovation 
system, is important. A successful VC policy will frequently require both types of 
policies; and there may be particular mixes between the two categories through time.  
 
4.4 Need to Link VC Policy with High Tech Policy  
A central flaw of many VC policies implemented up to and including the 1990s is the 
failure to link these to high tech policies more generally and, more specifically, to 
cluster emergence policies. The central reason seems to have been the static view of 
VC policies and the emphasis in promoting VC as a pool of money almost exclusively 
with the objective of closing early finance gaps. More recently, some policies have 
pursued VC-related objectives, such as promoting of  University-Industry links and 
angel networks, making bankruptcy laws more favorable to SUs, facilitating the 
creation new technological infrastructures. Despite this improvement, there is limited 
awareness within both the policymaking and the academic communities of the need to 
link VC policies with high tech cluster creation policies, particularly clusters of the 
entrepreneurial type. 
A no less important reason why the link between VC policies and high tech cluster 
creation policies was not recognized was the prevailing view on the impossibility of 
targeting EHTCs. Bresnahan et al (2001) perspective on this matter does not 
sufficiently recognize the centrality of a cluster’s pre-emergence phase and its 
particular configuration in explaining subsequent cluster dynamics (emergence or non-
emergence).  
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4.5 A  New Policy Process: Redefining STE and Innovation Priorities prior to 
Identifying and Designing new Policies 
Most VC policies in the past have not been derived from a prior, explicit process of 
identifying new priorities in VC-relevant areas, that is, related to STE and innovation. 
As emphasized in previous sections these priorities are nowadays critical for 
determining VC (directed and relevant) policy objectives. This implies a more realistic 
but at the same time more complex policy process which the countries of Europe and 
Israel should seriously consider prior to or in parallel with the design and 
implementation of a new set of innovation, VC and science and technology policies. 
Once new priorities are set, it is much easier to identify key policy objectives. 
 
5. A TYOPOLOGY OF VC POLICY OBJECTIVES  
Our point of departure for defining VC policy objectives is the heterogeneity of VC 
policies which was extensively discussed in previous sections, and which in part flows 
from cross country/region/context differences in strategic priorities even those relevant 
to a particular area, say LS. Our purpose here is not to identify policies for a particular 
country; rather  in the following sub-sections, we analyze the set of possible policy 
objectives which individual countries or regions may want to consider during their VC 
policy formulation processes.  
 
5.1 Promoting VC* industry/market Emergence  
What is aimed at is creation of a new industry/market/cluster, which we define as a 
higher level of organization or multi-agent structure. Moreover, in Israel the new VC 
industry/market was embedded in a new EHTC a fact that led us above to suggest that 
in some cases, VC* emergence policies should be part of broader EHTC policies. In 
those countries that succeeded with policies of this type, the VC industry seems to 
have emerged from a set of pre-emergence conditions that provided the right setting 
for attempting to trigger and sustain emergence. The dynamics of VC* seem to have 
been closely linked with those of ICT-oriented EHTCs. 
There are several alternative patterns of relationship between VC emergence and 
industrial clustering. These depend on local or domestic idiosyncrasies; and on sectoral 
differences. As a result, at times VC-related policies whose objective is emergence 
would respond to different specific targets and should be planned and implemented in 
different ways. In what follows we offer a brief taxonomy of such variants based on 
the experiences of Israel and Scotland/UK. 
The variants of policy when the objective is VC/VC* emergence pertains to at least 
five different dimensions: 1) ICT/LS/Other orientation of the future VC 
industry/market; 2) Dominant Organizational Forms of VC organizations; 3) Role of 
BAs; and 4) an industry, a market or both an industry and a market. 
 
5.1.1 Area/Technology Orientation of the VC industry/market 
Whether or not to promote emergence of a LS-specialized VC* segment is a major 
issue in Israel which already has a well-developed ICT oriented VC* segment (and 
EHTC) with some investments in biotech and important investments in the medical 
devices area. Since no detailed and well specified strategic priority concerning what   16   
type of biotech cluster suits that country it is too early to establish whether or not 
emergence of a drug development oriented VC* industry/market (and associated 
cluster) should be aimed at. Moreover, the specifics of the intermediation form of such 
LS cluster configuration would seem to be quite different from that which evolved for 
ICT. In addition, alternative emergence profiles are conceivable even within ICT (e.g. 
in Israel it seemed to have been VC*-led, see Avnimelech and Teubal 2006) and 
certainly when we compare ICT with LS. 
It should be emphasized that in contrast to the Israeli and Silicon Valley experience 
with ICT clusters, the emergence profile for a LS cluster need not be VC-led.  
Moreover, the new VC-related intermediation f orm associated with ICT-oriented 
EHTCs need not be the only form of new intermediation required for emergence of 
entrepreneurial LS-related clusters. For the ethical drug variant of the  latter and to a 
much larger degree than the former, ‘management’ and ‘capabilities’ intermediation 
(together with intermediation which exploits economies of scale, scope and learning) 
and not only ‘financial intermediation’ may be critical for successful emergence. This 
means that a slew of new, specialized intermediaries w ould be required, or 
alternatively, that the single (or small number of types of) intermediary organization(s) 
should bundle much more than for entrepreneurial ICT clusters, financial services with 
other added value services. 
 
5.1.2 Dominant VC*/VC Organizational Form  
In the US, the dominant VC organizational form eventually came to be the LP form, 
which also was the VC organization type targeted by Israel’s Yozma Program in 1993. 
In other contexts, it is possible that more than one type of VC organization should be 
promoted. Which ones may reflect both local idiosyncratic factors or/and institutional 
set ups and other factors such as whether the target is ICT or LS. In the UK, we 
acknowledge a proliferation of VC types, some of which are the result of trajectories 
of development embedded in regional sub-systems, whereas others originate from the 
implementation of government regulation. These experiences and facts at least 
suggests the possibility that VC* policies directed to industry/market emergence may 
target either  a dominant type of VC organization (which one may depend on the 
specifics of sector/technology, and existing financial institutions) or a set of such 
organizations.  
As mentioned in previous sections the target depends on existing circumstances 
including existing forms of financial of VC/PE organization (which may either help or 
hinder more  appropriate forms of organization) and stage of cluster development, 
without being circumscribed to LPs. For instance, Don and Harrison (2006) highlight 
that an important characteristic of the Scottish equity capital market is the role played 
by a small number of very large investments and a large number of BAs. A bout one 
third of investment by value between 2000 and 2003 was generated by the three largest 
transactions in each year, and this proportion fluctuated between 41% and 22%. 
Further, BAs represent a crucial source of funding for early-stage companies, 
providing in the same period around £115m to local businesses (27% of all risk capital 
investment, excluding the three largest transactions).  
It follows that, depending on local circumstances, policies oriented to VC/VC* 
emergence need not focus exclusively on the promotion of LPs. Other forms may be   17   
relevant, and in some cases, it may be conceivable that policies should aim at a 
distribution of organizational forms rather than at one, dominant organizational form.  
 
5.1.3 Role of BAs 
The above conclusion holds as regards the promotion of BAs or a mix between these 
and formal VC/VC* organizations which could become, in places like Scotland, a 
central objective of the VC/VC* structure directed to emergence. This is because 
across industrial sectors, early-stage companies present a varying set of challenges to 
investors some of which tend to complicate their risk profile in ways that formal VC 
organizations, despite being capable of overcoming a number of ‘mild’ sources of 
market failure, find it difficult to confront. To begin with, SUs generally lack tangible 
assets required as collateral to obtain finance. Secondly, investees may use the funds 
raised to support transaction-specific activities, which increases the risk of non-
redeployability in the case of failure.  Thirdly, new ventures may be formed by 
investor-unready directors who struggle to demonstrate a credible revenue model. This 
involves a variety of problems: the inability to exhibit a unique selling proposition, a 
credible route to market, and the possibility of a successful exit (MH 2003). Finally, 
there can be information asymmetries. Gompers and Lerner (2001) examine the case 
of biotech companies and refer to situations where the management team either invests 
in activities that are not strictly related to core business objectives or raises 
unsustainable amounts of debt.  
BAs can contribute to solve some of the above sources of ‘market/system failures’, and 
this presumption reflects the fact that they are one of the most important sources of 
early stage funding for technology-based and high growth potential companies. In the 
case of Scotland, there are several angel groups. The leading syndicates have high 
visibility. Don and Harrison (2006) estimate that in 2004 539 investments involved 
BAs who were therefore responsible for over £600M of private investment - while in 
the 2000/2003 period, SCEn co-investment funds were involved in 44% of the total 
number of VC transactions.  
Although the contribution of BAs to the regional economy is frequently 
underestimated (MH 2000),  BAs can add non-monetary value by providing 
management expertise, strengthening the team by taking on a non-executive role, and 
offering access to vital networks. The analytical implication is that an active fringe of 
BAs  can be  a pre-emergence condition  as  it promotes variation of approaches, 
increases the number of SUs and act as an early mechanism of selection. 
 
5.1.4 Emergence of a VC industry, market, or both 
A major issue is whether a country would wish to develop a local VC/VC*industry and 
market or only a local market plus whatever is required to link with the global 
industry. In Israel during the 1990s there was not an option not to develop a local 
industry since foreign VCs, with no local agents to collaborate with in syndications, 
would not open offices in the country (the export of VC services from the US to Israel 
without a local presence in the country was impossible at the time). However, this 
constraint might become less and less relevant pari passu with the growth of the global 
VC industry.    18   
It is an open question whether every region in countries like the UK or regions like 
Scotland need a local, formal VC sector. As described in the previous section and 
suggested by MH (2003) and Rosiello and Parris (2008), a VC industry structured 
around local LPs does not exist in Scotland. BAs and their networks are a component 
of what could be termed the pre-emergence stage, a fact that suggests a different model 
of evolution. From a SE angle, the strategy adopted by SCEn (in contrast with the 
Israeli case where both a market and an industry were developed) can be interpreted as 
an attempt to increase VC flow into new and growing businesses, which may become 
“investor ready” propositions for non Scottish-based institutional VCs who are mainly 
located in the Southeast. This may provide effective growth avenues to local SUs and 
enhance non-local VCs interest in Scottish ventures - which is to a degree happening 
(MH 2003) especially in the domain of LS (Rosiello and Parris 2008). The Scottish 
example suggests that pre-emergence conditions and policies are oriented to stimulate 
VC to the extent that this would enable effective linking with the broader UK-base of 
VC industry. The strategy would then seem to be to create a regional  ‘Scottish’ VC 
market and rely largely on the UK industry.  
 
5.2 Promoting pre-emergence conditions  
Whenever VC or VC/EHTC emergence is an objective of policy it must be that 
“appropriate” pre-emergence conditions prevail. Otherwise (and assuming that 
emergence is still a long-term objective) emergence policies should be delayed with 
the policy focus shifting to improving pre-emergence conditions. These mainly relate 
to (a) the definition of new intermediation forms adapted to domestic conditions, (b) to 
the promotion of investor-ready entrepreneurship, including technological capabilities 
and entrepreneurial culture, (c) effective coordination and partnership among various 
components of the innovation system, and (d) creation of links with external players.  
Our  SE framework is based on a VC industry ILC perspective  and on a 
multidimensional view of VC.  As VCs tend to invest in geographically proximate SUs 
(Powell et al. 2002; Zook, 2002, 2004; and Schwartz and El-Bar 2007) and act as 
“technological gate-keepers” that steer companies towards those regions with the ideal 
mix of factors to promote innovation (Florida and Kenney 1988), the emergence of VC 
markets/sectors is linked with that of EHTCs. The pre-emergence conditions to be 
promoted refer no less to the relevant high tech cluster than to VC* itself. EHTCs 
develop through cumulative processes and often originate in or are triggered  by 
unforeseeable events such as scientific breakthroughs or historical events (Feldman 
and Francis 2003). These and others, frequently with the support of policy, may lead to 
a critical mass of central factors (pool of SU and VC) which may lead to a particular 
profile of emergence.  While conceptualizing this process is difficult, it is critical in 
order to design and implement successful emergence policies. Alternatively, successful 
emergence policies require understanding of the possible profiles of emergence, 
including sets of conditions that precede emergence, a concept that has already been 
elaborated by Avnimelech and Teubal (2006).  
The Israeli experience also suggests that different policies are needed at different 
development phases (Avnimelech and Teubal 2008b), a conclusion that can also be 
applied to the case of Scotland (Rosiello and Orsenigo 2008). For a number of years 
the performances of the Scottish economy was influenced by multinationals operating 
in the financial services, gas, oil, transport and utility sectors. By the early 00s,   19   
however, the difficulties faced by some of these multinationals led to the severe 
decline of the Scottish ICT sector. At that point, the focus of policy interest shifted 
towards stimulating the creation of local ventures with high growth potential. Five 
industrial sectors were initially identified as those where Scotland had a competitive 
advantage, including LS and microelectronics (from a SE angle, these were ‘strategic 
priorities’ areas), later extended to eighteen.  
 
Figure 1. Scottish Life Science Strategy: sample of measures 
 
 
Some support programs operate horizontally across  sectors.  From the outset, the 
strategy included VC-directed policies such  as the  “Scottish Co-investment Fund” 
(SCF) - a £45m public/private equity fund that helps small companies to obtain money 
from banks and private investors by investing up to £500k - and the “Seed Fund” that 
invests up to £100K.  More recently, additional support is available via the “Scottish 
Venture Fund” that participates in investments up to £10M. LS draw a large proportion 
of these resources: 27% of the deals completed up to 2007 via the SCS involved 
biotech companies, with an average leverage ratio of private investment of 2.73 (2.48 
in all sectors).  
Aside from VC-directed policies, we find a range of related policies that target the 
demand-side of VC. These  initially included:  “Proof of Concept” that finances the 
commercialization of projects across Scottish Universities and research institutes; the 
“Smart and Spur Awards” that support new ventures to carry out innovative projects 
and commercialize new products and services; and the  “Investor Ready Fund”  that 
pays 50% of legal and accountancy fees to companies seeking a private investment.  
Later additions include schemes such as the “Score” and “Seekit” that support R&D 
projects jointly undertaken between public research bodies and private companies with 
specific technical needs; “Scottish Development International” helps Scottish 
companies gain access to people, technologies and business partners worldwide; and 
“Globalscot” is an international network and gateway to fellow members (mostly 
managers of biotech companies) worldwide   20   
Among the more recent initiatives, we find targeted schemes that aim at creating the 
infrastructure, skills and technology base, and networks that are necessary for EHTC 
emergence. Three “Intermediary Technology Institutes” (ITIs) have been set up to 
provide technological platforms for economic success.  Launched in September 2003, 
ITIs have £450 million to invest over a ten-year period in pre-competitive research 
project involving both industry and public research centers. The ITIs focus on LS, 
energy and multimedia.  The “Stem Cells Fund”  was created in 2006 to support 
projects  based in Scotland and aimed at getting stem cell therapies into humans. 
Scottish Health Innovation Ltd commercializes innovation arising within the NHS. 
The “Translational Medicine Research Collaboration” (TMRC) was launched in 2005 
and it involves four Scottish Universities and the NHS. Activities include: (i) setting 
up  a centre for the development of biomarkers; (ii) developing and coordinating 
clinical trials on defined disease populations; (iii) linking with the Scottish Clinical 
Research Network to deal with ethical approvals, data collation and statistical analysis 
of results; and (iv) coordinating research on  collected samples ( www.wyeth.co.uk–
translational research). 
 
5.3 Promoting VC* without Emergence in mind  
As noted earlier, a fully emerged US- type VC model sector in Scotland, especially in 
relation to the LS-segment, is probably not achievable nor does it seem to be a sine-
qua-non condition for bio-cluster emergence. Various works, including Martin et al 
(2005), MH (2003), and Rosiello and Parris (2008), show that VCs tend to be 
concentrated in the London Area and their investment in the Southeastern area of the 
UK. However, as suggested by MH (2003) and Don and Harrison (2006), Scottish 
grants and co-investment schemes are compatible with and stimulate investment in 
local business by a large and increasingly organized fringe of informal investors and 
BAs’ syndicated which constitute a peculiarity of the Scottish financial community.  
In certain contexts the objective of VC* policies (even in the longer run, after 
promotion of pre-emergence conditions) should not be triggering and sustaining 
emergence of a VC* industry or market. For example it is conceivable in situations 
where the institutional setting and prior policies are doing the job, that a country or 
region may want to add a measure of formal VC sources of finance and support to 
innovation in SU over an beyond what already exists, without wanting to develop a 
full fledged VC* industry/market. The objective of this kind of policy could be 
motivated by a ‘satisfying situation’, by a high perceived risk of adopting a policy 
oriented to VC* emergence, by the existence of idiosyncratic financial (semi public) 
institutions which do part of the job, or by a ‘wait and see’ attitude l eading to the 
creation of new options for future policy. 
Another case for promoting VC* without industry emergence in mind could be the 
case of regions where, after creating the pre-emergence conditions, a temporal increase 
in the pool of VC available may generate the appropriate reputation and attract the 
nearby VC industry to invest. For example, Beer-Sheva at the south of Israel do not 
need to create a separate VC industry, if it will create a competitive advantage in 
cleantech it will easily attract VC investment from “Tel-Aviv’s VC industry”.  
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5.4 Promoting Industry Consolidation and Diversification/Re-invention 
A successful VC industry emergence process may be subject to a rough test during the 
next technological bubble and subsequent bust; and it is not obvious that even very 
successful albeit new VC industries would be able to recover. For example it may be 
that the returns to post bust funds were low, and that this fact would compromise the 
survival of the industry as a whole e.g. its capacity to raise funds, especially from 
leading agents. In this situation, Governments may have to make explicit and creative 
efforts to overcome this danger e.g. by relaxing restrictions on pension funds’ 
investments, while letting the market undergo a rough ‘selection’ process. Government 
action may vary, depending on context. One aspect of VC consolidation may be the 
diffusion of ICT-oriented VC industries to serve the needs of new emerging 
technologies; others may involve diffusion towards non-high tech industries  and 
services. A third possibility is to emphasize the enhanced role, after or during industry 
maturity, of  BAs and other agents (such as CVCs and accelerators) could play. This 
last aspect of consolidation is crucial in order to enable cluster renewal and adjustment 
in coincidence with radical changes in the external environment. 
 
5.5 Complementary, VC-related Policies and policy actions 
Some of the VC-related policies that promote pre-emergence conditions should 
continue or even be reinforced during emergence in order to assure momentum of the 
process and its sustainability. These may include reinforcement of SU-oriented 
innovation policies including those focused to trigger and sustain VC-SU co-evolution. 
This could be related to the importance of creating a critical mass within a short period 
as well as a good reputation from the beginning of the process in order to trigger or 
sustain, maybe through entry of other agents including strategic investors, a  self-
reinforcing process of emergence. An example was the new technological incubator 
program, which was added to Israel’s existing grants to business sector R&D program, 
starting in 1991; a second example was significant reinforcement of the Grants to 
Business Sector R&D (from 136M$ in 1990 to 440M$ in 2000). Both contributed to 
the momentum of the VC*/EHTC emergence process, which took place between 1993-
8. In addition, related institutional changes may have to be implemented in parallel to 
the VC/EHTC directed policies promoting emergence. A major issue when 
considering VC-related policies is whether there is a strong link between VC 
emergence and E HTC emergence as it supposedly existed in Israel and in Silicon 
Valley. Hence, the set of VC-related policies could include EHTC emergence policies, 
such as targeting of specific areas of technology or STE policies. 
 
6.   CONCLUSIONS  
We present a new perspective to VC policy based on three novel components. These 
are a multidimensional view of VC, a SE perspective to VC policy and, as part of the 
latter, a ‘strategic level’ of policy whose main role is to identify (i) strategic priorities 
in VC/VC* and related EHTCs, and (ii) translating these into policy objectives and 
policy designs. VC is a multidimensional concept: it includes a pure ‘pool of money’ 
view, a view of VC organizations to manage this pool and a view of VC as an industry 
and/or a market. Each one of these is important for policy, especially for those 
countries that do not yet possess well functioning VC industries and/or markets, the   22   
objective of policy could be to trigger and sustain a process of emergence of such 
entities (mostly viewed as a cumulative, autocatalytic process involving dynamic 
economies of scale). 
The SE perspective to VC policy (broadly defined) emphasizes links at a moment of 
time and through time between VC and VC policy on the one hand, and EHTCs and 
EHTC policy on the other; and between these and other factors such as ITP. Thus, the 
Israeli and Silicon Valley example strongly suggests that VC and EHTC co-evolve 
during the emergence of both. Correspondingly, VC policies should be considered as 
part of both ITP and, contrary to some of the literature on clusters (Bresnahan et al 
2001), policies promoting cluster dynamics and EHTC emergence.  
A strategic level of policy is increasingly being recognized as a central component of 
policy making both in advanced and in industrializing economies. Its existence and 
functions follow from the  SE p erspective where  radical u ncertainty is assumed to 
prevail in many areas, with implications concerning the need to continuously adapt 
existing policies to the changing global (and frequently, domestic) environment. The 
main function of a strategic level of policy is ‘knowledge creation’, particularly with 
respect to the identification and specification of strategic priorities. Given the radical 
changes in the post 2000 environment, Europe’s new VC and EHTC policies should 
largely be based on a new set of strategic priorities. 
This framework of analysis fits both the Scottish & Israeli experience. It is consistent 
with the long period of ‘preparation’ in Israel prior to VC/EHTC emergence during 
1993-2000. During this period, a wide range of pre-emergence conditions evolved 
some being the outcome of policies such as the horizontal and neutral support of 
business sector R&D; others the result of political changes and changes in global 
markets and technology. Moreover, successful emergence was the result of a targeted 
VC-directed program (Yozma, implemented during 1992\3-7) itself the outcome of a 
problem solving strategic process leading to a new vision of high tech and to a new 
strategic  priority (promoting the creation and development of high tech SU 
components with VC as a private, domestic supporting structure). Some of the policies 
implemented in Scotland, on the other hand, could be associated with the generation of 
appropriate pre-emergence conditions where distinctive organizations like  BAs play 
important roles and where a LP ‘model’ of VC organization does not seem to have 
been ‘selected’ by SCEn. The set of policies followed is consistent with a vision of 
emergence of a market for VC and a LS-oriented cluster, with the VC industry serving 
this market being divided into a local component and a UK one. 
Our SE framework is also applicable to interpret the VC/VC* experience of several 
large European countries up to and including the 1990s,  where Europe had only 
limited success. The ‘positive’ and ‘normative’ perspective which seemed to guide 
European policy makers at the time was based on (i) VC viewed essentially as a ‘pool 
of money’; and (ii) a static framework of analysis focused on bridging or closing ‘early 
phase finance gaps for innovative companies’. On the contrary, this paper’s framework 
of analysis is explicitly dynamic; we propose that a novel policy objective could be 
triggering and sustaining emergence of a VC industry and/or market and of an 
associated EHTC.  
Hence, the perspective enshrined in this paper is the result of a multidimensional view 
of VC - a pool of money, organizations managing this pool, and industry and/or market 
which could emerge - and of a dynamic, ILC Perspective to the evolution of this entity   23   
that was originally developed to interpret Israel’s experience of the 1990s (Avnimelech 
and Teubal 2006). It is also the result of integrating two other areas of analysis. First, 
the dynamics of EHTCs particularly those of the Silicon Valley type (Bresnahan et al 
2001), where our contribution (also following Avnimelech and Teubal 2006, 2008a) is 
to focus on the co-evolution of such clusters and VC. Second, a dynamic view of 
innovation and VC policy whereby policy implemented at a certain point in time can 
create conditions for the subsequent development of other policies (Avnimelech and 
Teubal 2008b, Rosiello and Orsenigo 2008). 
The outcome is that VC policies broadly defined depend on the phase of evolution of: 
(i) VC or VC-related innovation finance organizations; and (ii) of the demand’ for 
such services by the SU segment, an industry or a cluster. They also depend on the 
institutional setting and on other country/region specific factors. Thus, while in some 
contexts/phases it would be worthwhile aiming at a VC market and/or industry, in 
others it may be critical to focus on pre-emergence conditions. These include 
stimulating innovation in firms, experimenting with new forms of innovation finance 
and intermediation, or strengthening the underlying STE infrastructure. 
A central tenet and underpinning of this approach is that due to enhanced turbulence 
and radical uncertainty, increasingly the gradual setting of new strategic priorities in 
a knowledge and research intensive fashion and within a specialized institution or set 
of institutions will become critical and to some extent should precede the actual 
formulation and implementation of new VC policies. It is also clear to us that setting 
such priorities goes far beyond undertaking a technological forecasting exercise 
(although this could well be one component). Moreover, in order to effect this 
transition it could be, at least in some countries of Europe including Israel, to give a 
hard look at the adequacy or inadequacy of existing policy institutions and governance 
profiles in those areas relevant to venture capital and high tech clusters  
While we do not aim  to identify and formulate specific policies for any particular 
country or region, this paper has raised a number of specific issues. To begin with, due 
to the role of critical mass in enhancing a self-reinforcing emergence process, early 
emergence policy should usually support VC agents belonging to a relatively narrow 
category or type. However, variety within already established markets has a significant 
role in reducing risk, in increasing economic potential and in enhancing future 
development and renewal. Therefore, we suggest t hat after emergence has been 
achieved policy should enhance variety creation in the VC market (enhancing BAs, 
Corporate VC, and other types of VC agents). This recommendation certainly holds 
both for Scotland/UK and for Israel. 
Secondly, one of the major reasons for VC policy failure in same European countries 
was the existence of a well-developed PE industry (oriented to late stages and non-
technology companies). This not only created a very high alternative cost for 
professionals in this field and for investment in general. It also, for other reasons, may 
have indirectly or directly hindered creation of an early phase oriented VC industry 
(what we have termed VC*) especially if its routines and strategy become dominant 
in the early phase of development of  VC if government funding was channeled to 
such institutions. A solution may be to create a fund-of-funds and/or to give 
incentives only to new VC companies not owned or related to existing PE companies 
(In Israel, a recognized ‘Yozma fund’ had to have  an independent VC management   24   
organization, although it still could have existing domestic financial institutions as 
limited partners). 
Thirdly, our approach to ITP, VC, and startup-intensive cluster development is 
evolutionary and is based on horizontal support of commercial innovation at firms at 
the beginning and targeted policies eventually (Avnimelech and Teubal 2008a,b). In 
this respect, we should emphasis that targeted policies should be implemented during 
‘windows of opportunity’ in the sense of existence of supportive external 
environment (such as technological revolutions and rapid economic growth) which 
could leverage domestic capabilities in a timely fashion. This is an additional 
complexity of targeted programs not  found in the implementation of horizontal 
programs. It points out to the importance of enhanced policy capabilities including 
targeting and strategic capabilities. 
Finally, policy makers should distinguish between policies aimed at creating a new 
VC industry and policies aimed at creating new  VC markets. This may be critical 
when trying to develop a VC market in a region that is nearby another region with a 
strong VC industry (Beer-Sheva/Tel Aviv or Scotland/London). In cases of VC 
market creation, after creating suitable pre-conditions and creating strong reputation, 
the region can enjoy the services of the nearby VC industry (Beer-Sheva at the south 
of Israel does not need to create a separate VC industry, if it will create a competitive 
advantage in cleantech it may be attract VC investment from Tel-Aviv). In such cases 
after creation of pre-emergence conditions, a temporal increase in the pool of VC 
available in a specific region may attract  investments, for example via enhanced 
reputation, from the neighboring VC industry.   25   
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i Gompers and Lerner’s (in their 1999 & 2004 volumes) approach is more than a simple ‘VC as a pool of 
money’ perspective (since it does explicitly consider the organizations dealing with VC) and less than 
‘VC as an industry and market that emerges’ perspective.  
ii Israel’s Yozma program is a successful instance of ‘Evolutionary Targeting’ (Avnimelech and Teubal 
2008b) 
iii In practice, it may be possible that “emergence” will bring about a stronger division of labor among 
actors that specialize in a certain number of sectors/investment-types. Indeed, while LPs have probably 
become the most common organization archetype in the UK context, EDGE FUNDS, ANGELS, VC 
TRUSTS also play a very important role. The normative implication is that a different set of measures 
ought to be planned and implemented depending of the characteristics of the local financial community 
and business sector.  
iv VC-directed policies should be distinguished from VC-related policies, with the former directed to VC 
and the latter to other functions or components of the innovation system. A successful VC policy will 
frequently require both types of policies; and there may be particular mixes between the two categories 
through time. 
v Note that a VC policy objective of ‘emergence of a VC industry and/or market’ through triggering and 
sustaining a ‘cumulative growth process with positive feedback’ does seem to part of the post 2000 
OECD VC policy vision (nor for that matter that of other countries of Europe). We come back to 
‘objectives of VC policies’ (see Section 5) 
vi A similar role was played by the Small Business Investment Companies in the 1960s and1970s in the 
US (see Gompers 1994) 
vii The RVCFs main operational criteria are: (i) each fund operates within a regional boundary, (ii) fund 
managers manage funds on a purely commercial basis, (iii) fund managers make all investment 
decisions, including how the investment should be structured. RVCFs can invest up to £250,000 in 
equity or debt into early stage businesses or needing development capital either for an acquisition or for 
organic growth. 
viii A market is defined by a product (including aspects of product bundling. dominant design and 
intermediation form); it requires a critical mass of demand and supply agents and of transactions; and it 
must be regulated by institutions e.g. concerning quality control, assuring information flow, and the 
provision of collective goods like standards (Antonelli and Teubal 2008b).  